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Abstract
Direct democracy is a special case of an ensemble of classifiers, where every person (classifier)
votes on every issue. This fails when the average voter competence (classifier accuracy) falls below
50%, which can happen in noisy settings where voters have only limited information, or when there are
multiple topics and the average voter competence may not be high enough for some topics. Represen-
tative democracy, where voters choose representatives to vote, can be an elixir in both these situations.
Representative democracy is a specific way to improve the ensemble of classifiers. We introduce a math-
ematical model for studying representative democracy, in particular understanding the parameters of a
representative democracy that gives maximum decision making capability. Our main result states that
under general and natural conditions,
1. Representative democracy can make the correct decisions simultaneously for multiple noisy issues.
2. When the cost of voting is fixed, the optimal representative democracy requires that representatives
are elected from constant sized groups: the number of representatives should be linear in the
number of voters.
3. When the cost and benefit of voting are both polynomial, the optimal group size is close to linear
in the number of voters.
This work sets the mathematical foundation for studying the quality-quantity tradeoff in a representative
democracy-type ensemble (fewer highly qualified representatives versus more less qualified representa-
tives).
1 Introduction
Suppose a voter-population of size n must vote in a referendum to make an important binary decision to
optimize some objective, e.g. social welfare growth over 10 years. A typical solution is direct democracy
which decides based on a majority vote, the so called “wisdom of the crowd.” Direct democracy works
when, the crowd does indeed have wisdom. In reality, the voters cannot directly observe which decision is
correct. Instead, they form beliefs using perceived information, which can be inaccurate, misinterpretable
or even manipulated. For example, suppose that each voter’s chance to vote for the correct decision, her
competence, is i.i.d. generated uniformly over [0, 0.99]. Now, the majority among many voters makes the
wrong decision with near certainty (Fey, 2003).
This example highlights a critical flaw of direct democracy, where voters participate in decision-making
irrespective of their competence. Direct democracy is particularly problematic in high noise situations,
where there is often a close tie in people’s beliefs between two choices, as in the previous example. Un-
fortunately, such close ties are common in real-life high-stakes scenarios. For example, in the 2016 United
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Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 51.89% voted for leave and 48.11% voted for remain.
In the 2016 US Presidential Election, 46.1% voted for Trump and 48.2% voted for Clinton.1 How can
democracy cope with high-stakes noisy issues where the average voter competence may drop below 0.5,
especially if there is misinformation?
One promising rescue is representative democracy, where voters form groups (or districts). Each group
chooses a representative, and representatives decide via a majority vote. The tradeoff is that there are fewer
representatives than base-voters, but, in return, each representative is (hopefully) better informed, being the
“wisest” from its group, or at least having a higher competence than the average in its group members.
Continuing the example above, let us now use representative democracy, where people are divided into
households (e.g. 5 people per group), and let each group choose the member with highest competence as its
representative. Then, with high probability the representative’s competence is strictly larger than 0.5. Now,
with enough representatives, a majority vote will now make the correct decision with near certainty (Fey,
2003).
Many countries and organizations adopt a mixture of direct democracy and representative democracy.
In the US, voters in each state vote on multiple referenda (direct democracy). In addition, voters elect
members of the congress (representative democracy) to make decisions for everyone by voting on bills.
Representative democracy can have a fixed number of representatives regardless of the population (e.g. the
US senate has 100 members, two from each state), or a fixed group size, where the number of representatives
is proportional to the population (between 1789 and 1913, the US House increases from 65 to 435 members
based on the nation’s population growth2). While it is widely accepted that representative democracy is
efficient due to lower operational cost and has better turnout than direct democracy, there is still a large
debate on the following fundamental question: which type of democracy makes better decisions?
We are not aware of quantitative answer to this question, nor a mathematical framework for analyzing
representative democracy w.r.t. its capability to make correct decisions. This is in sharp contrast to direct
democracy, which has been mathematically analyzed in depth to provide a justification of the “wisdom
of the crowd,” which dates back to the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the 18th century (Condorcet, 1785).
Roughly speaking, the Jury Theorem states that a large group of voters are likely to make a correct decision
by majority voting, which “lays, among other things, the foundations of the ideology of the democratic
regime” (Paroush, 1998). Direct democracy is just a representative democracy where each group has one
voter. Thus, a mathematical characterization of optimal representative democracies would also highlight
the subcases where direct democracy is best. The goal of this paper is to establish rigorous mathematical
foundations of representative democracy, and provide quantitative answers to the following key questions.
Key questions.
1. What is the optimal number of representatives for representative democracy?
2. How should one optimally divide the voters into groups, with each group electing one representative?
Specifically, what is the optimal size distribution for the groups?
We will answer these questions in a general setting, where the groups satisfy a weak form of homogeneity.
At a high level, the representative election process can be described by a function µ that takes a group as
input and outputs its representative. By homogeneous, we mean that this representative election function is
the same in every group. A concrete example of this paradigm is when each group runs the same type of
election process on its members who are independent and drawn from some underlying voter-distribution.
In our analysis, we consider two cases. The first is when there is a fixed cost for the voting. In this
case, the goal of the representative democracy is to maximize the chances of making the correct decision.
1These examples are only used to show real situations where close ties exist. We do not know if direct democracy would succeed
or fail in these cases since we do not know what the “correct” outcome is.
2After 1913 the number is fixed to 435.
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This is case is relevant to making extremely important decisions where the operational cost of voting is not
considered a valid tradeoff for correctness. The second case is when the cost of voting increases with the
number of representatives, in which case one must balance the cost with the benefit that accrues to all n
voters.
1.1 Our Contributions
We provide a novel mathematical model of representative democracy w.r.t. its ability to make correct deci-
sions. With our model, we obtain characterizations on optimal number of representatives in representative
democracy, and our main messages are the following.
1. When the cost of voting is fixed, fixed group size is optimal.
2. When the cost and benefit of voting are both polynomial, O(log n) representatives are optimal, where
n is the number of voters.
In our basic model, there is a single binary issue to be decided. n voters are divided into L groups, each
group chooses a representative by a representative selection function, and the representatives will use major-
ity voting to make a binary decision on the issue. We assume that each voter’s type is characterized by her
competence, which is her probability to vote for the correct decision on the issue, and is generated i.i.d. from
a distribution F . Let Ben(n) ∈ R denote the benefit of making the correct decision compared to making the
wrong decision for n voters, and let Cost(L) ∈ R denote the operational cost for L representatives to vote.
We reduce the representative selection function to a group competence function µ : N → [0, 1], which
maps each group size to the expected competence of the representative. We then extend the Condorcet
Jury Theorem to representative democracy by characterizing group competence functions that would choose
representatives to make the correct decision with probability 1 as n→∞. Our main theorems are surprising
characterizations of the optimal group size when the cost of voting is fixed.
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 (optimal representative democracy for single issue with fixed cost of voting,
informally put). Under natural and mild conditions on the group competence function µ and when Cost(L)
is a constant:
1. (Homogeneous groups) The optimal group size K∗(n) is at most a constant independent of n.
2. (Inhomogeneous groups) The optimal number of representatives L∗ is linear in n.
3. The optimal group size distribution is nearly homogeneous.
These results hold, independently of the specific details of the representative selection process. Let us
highlight why the result is unexpected in a concrete context. Suppose voter competence is drawn from
some continuous density on [0, 1] and a group elects the most competent of its voters as representative (very
optimistic since it cannot get better than that). Then by choosing larger and larger groups, the competence
of the representative approaches 1. The price paid is that there are fewer of these ultra-smart representatives,
but there will still be many of them as n → ∞. Indeed, one might posit that some optimal tradeoff exists
whereby the group size tends to infinity but at a slower rate than n so that the representative gets smarter and
smarter and there are more and more representatives. Our theorem establishes the contrary. The optimal
group size will never exceed some constant (the constant’s value may depend on the specific parameters of
the selection process).
To prove our results, we use novel combinations of combinatorial bounds. In addition, some of our re-
sults may be of independent interest, for example, Lemma 7 answers an open question on the probability for
majority voting to be correct when the average competence of voters is exactly 0.5 where there are no general
results for the non-asymptotic behavior (Fey, 2003) and the asymptotic behavior is only conjectured (Owen
et al., 1989, Lemma 5).
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We then consider the case of polynomial cost and polynomial benefit, that is, there exist constants q1 > 0
and q2 > 0 such that Cost(L) = Lq1 and Cost(n) = nq2 . A special case is linear cost and linear gain, where
q1 = q2 = 1. It turns out that the cost of voting has a significant impact on the optimal group size.
Theorems 5 (optimal representative democracy for single issue with polynomial cost and polynomial
benefit, informally put). Under natural and mild conditions on the group competence function µ and
suppose there exist constant q1 > 0 and q2 > 0 such that
Cost(L)
Ben(n) = Θ(
Lq1
nq2 ):
1. The optimal homogeneous group size is Ω(n/ log n).
2. When µ(K) converges to 1 at a polynomial rate, the optimal homogeneous group size is Θ(n/ log n)
3. If µ(K) is upper bounded away from 1, then the optimal group size is Θ(n).
Finally, we extend our analysis to the situation where the representative will have to vote on d > 1
possibly correlated issues. This is the case with the US Senate and House members who after election
may have to cast a vote on multiple occasions on different issues (about once per week). Now, the group
competence function µ must be extended to a mapping from group size K to a 2d-dimensional multinomial
distribution. We extend the Condorcet Jury Theorem to this setting, and our main theorem states that the
optimal group size is increased by Θ(ln d).
Theorem 7 (optimal representative democracy for multiple issues with fixed cost, informally put).
Under natural and mild conditions on the group competence function, the optimal group size is O(ln d) and
the optimal number of representatives is Ω(n/ ln d) for d ≥ 2 issues.
With multiple issues, there is no obvious way to elect representatives to achieve consistency in every
issue. For example, when issues are independent, if a group picks its representative according to its favorite
(or random) issue, the results can be disastrous. We introduce a natural representative selection process
for multiple issues, the MAX SUM process, which chooses the group member with the maximum sum of
competences across all issues. This mimics a small group (e.g. a household) choosing its most “informed”
member. We show that under natural assumptions and for independent issues, MAX SUM is consistent on all
issues.
1.2 Related Work and Discussions
There have been large voices in the US in favor of increasing the number of House representatives, as
nowadays each of them represents roughly 700K people, and such number used to be as low as 33K. The
arguments are mostly from the perspective of representation rights and the intention of framers of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights (Flynn, 2012; Bartlett, 2014; Humphreys, 2016). More information and
activities can be found at http://www.thirty-thousand.org. Our work provide a mathematical
foundation to analyze the rationale behind this move.
While mathematical models of representative democracy are not new, e.g. (Besley and Coate, 1997;
Auriol and Gary-Bobo, 2012), we are not aware of previous work that quantitatively characterizes optimal
representative democracy w.r.t. its ability to make correct decisions. Our work is related to the literature
on extensions of The Condorcet Jury Theorem to heterogeneous agents, where voters may have different
competences (Nitzan and Paroush, 1980; Grofman et al., 1983; Nitzan and Paroush, 1984). More previous
work along this vein is in one of the three subareas: (1) understanding the conditions for consistency of
majority voting (Owen et al., 1989; Paroush, 1998; Kanazawa, 1998; Fey, 2003; Sapir, 2005), (2) studying
optimal population size to maximize the correctness of majority voting (Feld and Grofman, 1984; Miller,
1986; Gradstein and Nitzan, 1987; Paroush and Karotkin, 1989; Berend and Paroush, 1998; Ben-Yashar and
Paroush, 2000; Mukhopadhaya, 2003; Karotkin and Paroush, 2003; Berend and Sapir, 2005, 2007; Stone
4
and Kagotani, 2013; Ben-Yashar and Zahavi, 2011), and (3) incentivizing voters to increase their compe-
tence (Nitzan and Paroush, 1980; Karotkin and Paroush, 1995; Ben-Yashar and Paroush, 2003). See Nitzan
and Paroush (2017) for a recent survey, including a nice overview of extensions of the Condorcet Jury
theorem to dependent voters and strategic voters.
Our work on single issue is related to the first subarea (consistency) and the second subarea (optimal
size). The key differences are, first, in our work, the competence of the representatives are computed en-
dogenously as a result of partitioning and representative selection, while the competence of voters are given
as input in the first subarea above. Second, in our work, increasing the group size will reduce the number
of groups, thus may reduce the correctness of majority voting, even though each representative has a higher
competence, while in the second subarea above there is one group of voters with variable size, who directly
vote on the issue. In other words, our framework allows for a quantitative analysis of the quality vs. quantity
tradeoff in representative democracy. Our work on multiple issues is significantly different from previous
work.
Our work is related but different to two recent works on liquid democracy (a.k.a. delegative democ-
racy). Cohensius et al. (2017) studied proxy voting, where a set of proxies are selected either randomly or
voluntarily, and each voter chooses a proxy to vote for her. The authors compared the accuracy of proxy
voting theoretically and experimentally, and identify conditions for proxy voting to be superior than direct
democracy. Kahng et al. (2018) studied whether delegation mechanisms on networks can improve direct
democracy w.r.t. the probability to reveal the ground truth. The main difference between our work and the
two paper is the dynamic of decision-making process, and therefore, the main questions are different. In
our work (representative democracy), voters are divided into multiple groups, and each group chooses a
representative to vote for the group members. In the work of Cohensius et al. (2017), proxies are chosen
first, and are then weighted by their popularity. In the work of Kahng et al. (2018), each voter can delegate
her vote and all votes delegated to her, to another voter with higher competence. We note that operational
cost of voting was also not considered in (Cohensius et al., 2017) and (Kahng et al., 2018).
Our work is also related to recent research in computational social choice that uses statistics to make
better decisions (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Young,
1988; Procaccia et al., 2012; Pivato, 2013; Elkind and Shah, 2014; Azari Soufiani et al., 2014; Xia, 2016).
These works focus on direct democracy, not representative democracy.
Lastly, our results on multiple issues is related to multi-issue voting (Koriyama et al., 2013; Skowron,
2015; Lang and Xia, 2016; Conitzer et al., 2017). The main difference is that the consideration in multi-issue
voting is often fairness and representativeness, rather than making correct decisions.
2 Modeling Representative Democracy
In this section we propose a mathematical model for representative democracy for one issue. We will extend
it to multiple issues in Section 4. As in the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we assume that voters’ ability to vote
for the correct decision is drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F . The voters are divided into L ≥ 1 groups. For
any group ` with K voters, whose competences are {q`,1, . . . , q`,K}, a deterministic or randomized repre-
sentative selection process V` chooses a member q`. The chosen representative casts a vote, and majority
voting succeeds if strictly more than half of representatives vote 1. The process for a group to choose a
representative to vote is summarized below.
F generate voters {q`,1, . . . , q`,K} elect representative q` cast vote x`
Formally, our basic model is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A representative democracy for one issue is composed of the following component.
• Issue. Suppose there is one issue to decide, whose outcome is 1 (correct), and 0 incorrect.
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• Partition function ~K. For any number of voters n, ~K denote a partition function that divides n voters
into L(n) groups, that is, ~K(n) = (K1, . . . ,KL(n)) > 0 and
∑L(n)
i=1 Ki = n.
•Distribution of competence F . We assume that each voter’s type is characterized by her competence,
which is the probability for her to vote for 1. Each voter’s competence is i.i.d. generated from a distribution
F over [0, 1].
•Representative selection process V`. Suppose group ` hasK users whose competences are q`,1, . . . , q`,K
respectively. The group uses a (randomized) process V`(q`,1, . . . , q`,K) to select a representative q`, whose
vote is represented by a random variable x`.
• Voting by the representatives. The chosen representatives will vote for 1 with probability equivalent
to her competence, and vote for 0 otherwise. The majority rule is used to decide the outcome based on
representatives’ votes. We assume that a strict majority of votes is necessary to make the correct decision.
That is, when there is a tie, the outcome is 0 (incorrect).
When each group has exactly 1 member, we obtain the direct democracy, otherwise we have the repre-
sentative democracy as in the following example.
Example 1 (Uniform Voters with Uniform Process). Suppose there areL ≥ 1 groups, each group hasK ≥ 1
members. Each voter’s competence is i.i.d. generated from a uniform distribution F = Uniform[a, b]. For
all groups, V` chooses a member uniformly at random. It is not hard to see that majority voting by the
representatives is correct with probability no more than 0.5 when a+ b < 1. 
We note that the vote of group `’s representative, i.e. the random variable x`, is characterized entirely
by its expectation, which contains all information needed in the analysis in this paper. Therefore, we will
simplify the representative selection process to a single group competence function µ, which specifies the
expected competence of the representative as a function of the group size K.
Definition 2. For one issue, a representative democracy is a selection function µ : N 7→ [0, 1].
For example, the selection function for the uniform process in Example 1 can be represented by µU(K) =
(a + b)/2 for all K. We will see that the selection function significantly simplifies the process in the fol-
lowing two examples. In the next example, the group chooses its most-informed member—the one with the
highest competence—as the representative.
Example 2 (Max Process). As in Example 1, suppose F = Uniform[a, b]. Each group now chooses the
member with the highest competence as the representative. So q` = max{q`,1, . . . , q`,K}. In other words,
q` is the K-th order statistic of K uniformly distributed random variables, which means that
q`−a
b−a is a Beta
random variable with PDF Beta(K, 1) Gentle (2009), whose mean is KK+1 . We call this representative
democracy the MAX process, denoted by µmax. Therefore,
µmax = E[x`] =
K
K + 1
× (b− a) + a = 1
K + 1
a+
K
K + 1
b

The MAX process serves as an upper bound on group competence functions, as no other process can
select a voter with a higher competence. Often the competence is not directly observable as in Example 2.
However, when the group size is not too large, for example a group is a household, then it is natural to
assume that the family members are able to choose the max-informed representative. Nevertheless, this
process might be noisy, which is captured in the next example.
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Example 3 (Noisy-Max Process). As in Example 1, suppose F = Uniform[a, b]. Given a K-dimensional
vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pK) such that p1 · · · ≥ pK ≥ 0 and
∑K
i=1 pi = 1. For any i ≤ K, suppose the
group chooses the member with i-th highest competence as the representative with probability pi. Let q`,i
denote the i-th highest competence. It follows that q`,i−ab−a is a Beta random variable with PDF Beta(K+ 1−
i, i) Gentle (2009), whose mean is K+1−iK+1 . We call this representative democracy the NOISY-MAX process,
denoted by µ~p. Therefore,
µ~p(K) =
K∑
i=1
pi
(
i
K + 1
a+
K + 1− i
K + 1
b
)
= (~p · ~k+)a+ (~p · ~k−)b,
where ~k+ = ( 1K+1 ,
2
K+1 , . . . ,
K
K+1) and
~k− = ( KK+1 ,
K−1
K+1 , . . . ,
1
K+1). 
It is easy to verify that the group competence function for MAX process is monotonically increasing in
K and is between a and b, while the group competence function for UNIFORM process outputs the same
value for all K.
3 Optimal Representative Democracy for One Issue
In this section, we focus on the characterizing optimal representative democracy for one issue.
3.1 Consistent Representative Democracy
We first extend the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem to representative democracy. Let us first formally
define consistency, the main desired property of a representative democracy. As the number of voters in-
creases, i.e. asymptotically in n, it should be possible to choose a partition of n voters into L groups, with
potentially different number of voters in each group, such that with probability 1 the majority representatives
vote for 1.
Given ~K = (K1, . . . ,KL(n)), we let Sn, ~K,µ denote the random variable that represents the frac-
tion of 1’s in L(n) independent Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities (µ([ ~K(n)]1), . . . ,
µ([ ~K(n)]L(n))), where for any i ≤ L(n), [ ~K(n)]i = Ki is the i-th component of ~K(n). In other words,
Sn, ~K,µ is
1
L(n) of the Poisson trail that represents the representatives’ votes.
Definition 3. Given a partition function ~K and a group competence function µ, for any n, we let Rn( ~K, µ)
denote the probability for majority voting by representatives according to ~K and µ to succeed. That is,
Rn( ~K, µ) = P(Sn, ~K,µ >
1
2).
The subscript n in Rn is sometimes omitted when causing no confusion.
Definition 4. A representative democracy with group competence function µ is consistent if there exists
a partition function ~K(n) for which the majority voting of representatives succeeds with probability 1 as
n→∞, that is, limn→∞Rn( ~K, µ) = 1.
Theorem 1. For each distribution F , the representative democracy with group competence function µ is
consistent if and only if there exists K∗ ∈ N such that µ(K∗) > 0.5.
Proof. ⇒: suppose for the sake of contradiction, µ(K∗) ≤ 0.5 but there exists ~K such that limn→∞Rn( ~K, µ) =
1. It follows that for any n, Rn( ~K, µ) is no more than the average value of L(n) Bernoulli trials, each suc-
ceeds with probability 0.5. However, the probability for the latter to be strictly larger than 0.5 is no more
than 0.5, because its PDF is symmetric and its mean is 0.5. This leads to a contradiction .⇐: we choose
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the partition function such that all but one group have K∗ members. It follows that as n → ∞ the average
competence is at least n/K∗−1n/K∗+1µ(K∗) >
1
2 . This means that Rn( ~K, µ) = 1 as n goes to infinity (Fey,
2003).
Costly voting. We now formally define the benefit of correct decision, cost of voting, and the social welfare
for optimization.
Definition 5. For any n and L, let Ben(n) ∈ R denote the benefit of making the correct decision and let
Cost(L) denote the monetary cost of maintainingL representatives. Given a partition ~K = (K1, . . . ,KL(n)) ∈
NL(n), the social welfare of ~K is the expected benefit minus the cost of voting, that is,
SW( ~K) = Ben(n)Rn( ~K, µ)− Cost(L) = Ben(n)
(
Rn( ~K, µ)− Cost(L)Ben(n)
)
In the following subsections we will characterize optimal ~K that maximizes SW( ~K) for different cases.
3.2 Optimal Group Size for Single Issue: Fixed Cost of Voting
In this subsection we focus on the setting where the cost of voting is fixed regardless of the number of
representatives. Since the cost of voting is fixed, the goal is to find the optimal partition ~K that maximizes
Rn( ~K, µ).
Before we formally present our main results, let us first discuss the effect of increasing the size of groups
at a high level. The effect can be seen as a tradeoff between quality (competence of each representative)
vs. quantity (the total number of representatives), and we will see that it comes down to a form of mean
vs. variance tradeoff.
The quality vs. quantity tradeoff. Suppose n is fixed and we are deciding to use group size of K1 or K2,
where K1 < K2 and µ(K2) ≥ µ(K1) > 0.5, and for the purpose of presentation, suppose that both divides
n. That is, n = K1L1 = K2L2. Let ~K1 = (K1 . . . ,K1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
) and ~K2 = (K2 . . . ,K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
).
When there are K1 members in each group, each representative has competence µ(K1) < µ(K2). On
the other hand, the number of representatives is L1 > L2. Therefore, we have E(Sn, ~K1,µ) = µ(K1) ≤
µ(K2) = E(Sn, ~K2,µ), while the variance of Sn, ~K2,µ, which is µ(K1)(1 − µ(K1))/L1 can potentially be
smaller than the variance of Sn, ~K2,µ.
3 Therefore, the optimal group size K∗ minimizes the left tail probabil-
ity of S < 0.5. This can roughly be seen as a mean vs. variance tradeoff, as illustrated using the distribution
of Sn, ~K,µ in Figure 1, where we set n = 2000, F = Uniform[0.44, 0.55], the MAX process µmax is used,
and we compare the distribution of three group sizes: K = 2 (low mean, low variance), K∗ = 8 (optimal,
middle), and K = 20 (high mean, high variance).
Naturally, our next goal is to identify an optimal number of representatives (groups), denoted by L∗(n).
We will first focus on the specific partition functions where almost all groups have the same size, with the
exception for the last group, whose size is allowed to be larger than other groups. This is a natural setting in
practice because each representative is supposed to represent equal number of voters. Later in this section
we will show how to extend our study to general partition functions.
Definition 6 (Homogeneous groups). Given n and a group sizeK, in the homogeneous setting, L = bn/Kc
representatives are selected using partition function ~HK = (K, . . . ,K︸ ︷︷ ︸
L−1
, n− (L− 1)K).
3It is possible for Sn, ~K2,µ to have a smaller variance, if µ(K) grows faster than linear.
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Figure 1: The mean vs. variance tradeoff in choosing different group sizes.
Next, we prove a general result: among all homogeneous group size settings, the optimal group size is
bounded by a constant, provided that some value of K can achieve consistency and the group competence
function µ is polynomially bounded away from 1 as K goes to infinity. Let K∗hom(n) denote the optimal
homogeneous group size that maximizes SW( ~HK), where Cost(L) is a constant. In other words, K∗hom(n)
maximizes Rn( ~HK∗hom(n), µ), the probability for the majority of representatives to vote for the correct deci-
sion.
Theorem 2 (Optimal homogeneous group size). Suppose the Cost(L) is a constant, there exists K∗ ∈ N
such that µ(K∗) ≥ 12 +  for 0 <  < 12 , and for all K ∈ N, µ(K) ≤ 1 − A/Kα for constants A > 0
(w.l.o.g. A ≤ 1) and α ≥ 0. Then, K∗hom(n) ≤ cK∗, where
c =
−4
ln(1− 42)
(
ln
32
92A
+ α ln
4αK∗
e
− α ln | ln(1− 42)|
)
.
The intuition is that as K increases, we experience diminishing returns with respect to µ because µ is
bounded away from 1. On the other hand, there is a loss due to decreasing L = bn/K c, the number of
representatives. We find this constant bound surprising because one may expect that the best tradeoff is
achieved when K is a function of n, but our theorem proves that it is a constant.
Proof. (of Theorem 2) We first prove a series of lemmas as building blocks. W.l.o.g. suppose each of the
first L − 1 groups has exactly K members. We first observe an elementary bound that allows us to ignore
the last group whose number of representatives is unknown,
P
[
L−1∑
`=1
x` ≥
⌈
L+ 1
2
⌉]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R−(L,µ(K))
≤ Rn( ~HK , µ) ≤ P
[
L−1∑
`=1
x` ≥
⌈
L− 1
2
⌉]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R+(L,µ(K))
.
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The functions R− and R+ are Binomial upper tail probabilities,
R−(L, p) =
L−1∑
`=d L+12 e
(
L− 1
`
)
p`(1− p)L−1−`.
R+(L, p) =
L−1∑
`=d L−12 e
(
L− 1
`
)
p`(1− p)L−1−`.
For any n,K, µ, and L = bn/K c, we have R−(L, µ(K)) ≤ Rn( ~HK , µ) ≤ R+(L, µ(K)). The following
five lemmas are properties of R−(L, p) and R+(L, p). So far, we have not yet invoked any properties of the
group competence function µ.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of R(L, p)). For fixed L, R−(L, p) and R+(L, p) are increasing in p. For fixed
p > 12 , R−(L, p) and R+(L, p) are increasing in L.
Lemma 2. For p ≤ 12 , R+(L, p) ≤ 34 (the maximum is attained for L = 3, p = 12 ).
We will prove bounds on R−(L, p) and R+(L, p), for which we will need bounds on binomial probabil-
ities and central binomial coefficients. Specifically,
Lemma 3 (Binomial Tail Inequality). Given p > 12 , L and k ≤ dL/2 e,(
L
k
)
pk(1− p)L−k ≤
k∑
`=0
(
L
`
)
p`(1− p)L−` ≤ p
2p− 1
(
L
k
)
pk(1− p)L−k.
Proof. The lower bound is just the last term in the sum. The upper bound comes from the observation that
each term in the sum is at least a factor µ/(1− µ) bigger than the previous term (because k ≤ dL/2 e).
Lemma 4 (Near-Central binomial coefficient bound). For L > 1,
3
4
· 4
L/2
√
piL
≤
(
L⌈
1
2(L− 1)
⌉) ≤ 2 · 4L/2√
piL
.
Lemma 5 (Bounding R−(L, p) and R+(L, p)). For 12 < p < 1,
1−
(
2
(2p− 1)
)
· (4p(1− p))
L/2
√
piL
≤ R−(L, p) ≤ R+(L, p) ≤ 1− 3
8p
· (4p(1− p))
L/2
√
piL
.
The proofs are relegated to the appendix.
We are ready to prove the theorem. Let c be defined as in the statement of the theorem. We may assume
n > cK∗ otherwise the theorem automatically holds. Further, if L∗ = 1, then there is just one group and
any K > K∗ will also have just one group and be equivalent. Therefore, we may assume L∗ ≥ 2. Now
suppose K > cK∗. Define µK = µ(K) and LK = bn/K c, µ∗ = µ(K∗) and L∗ = bn/K∗ c. Observe
that LK ≤ L∗. We show that R(L∗, µ∗) ≥ R(LK , µK) which means that K cannot be better than K∗ for a
homogeneous partition of n, proving the theorem.
If µK ≤ 12 then R+(LK , µK) ≤ 34 (Lemma 2). We show that R−(L∗, µ∗) > 34 . Indeed, since n > cK∗,
we have n/K∗ > c ≥ −4ln(1−42) · ln 3292A , and so
L∗ =
⌊
n
K∗
⌋
≥ n
2K∗
>
−2
ln(1− 42) · ln
32
92A
=⇒ (1− 4
2)L∗/2

√
piL∗
<
9A
32
√
piL∗
<
1
4
,
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where in the last inequality we used A ≤ 1 and L∗ ≥ 2. Now, using the bound for R− from Lemma 5,
we conclude that R−(L∗, µ∗) > 34 , which proves K cannot be optimal. Therefore, we may assume that
µK >
1
2 . Also, if  =
1
2 then the representatives always vote for the correct decision and the theorem
automatically holds, so we may assume  < 12 . Using Lemma 5,
Rn( ~HK∗ , µ)−Rn( ~HK , µ) ≥ R−(L∗, µ∗)−R+(LK , µK)]
≥ 3
8
1
µK
· (4µK(1− µK))
LK/2
√
piLK
−
(
2
2µ∗ − 1
)
· (4µ∗(1− µ∗))
L∗/2
√
piL∗
(L∗≥LK)≥ 3
8
1
µK
· (4µK(1− µK))
LK/2
√
piL∗
−
(
2
2µ∗ − 1
)
· (4µ∗(1− µ∗))
L∗/2
√
piL∗
≥ (positive) ·
1− C ((4µ∗(1− µ∗))L∗/LK
4µK(1− µK)
)LK/2 ,
where C = 163 · µK2µ∗−1 =
8µK
3 . Note that C ≤ 83 (because µK < 1) and C > 1 (because µK > 12 and
 < 12 ). We prove the term in square parentheses is positive. Observe that
L∗
LK
=
bn/K∗ c
bn/K c ≥
bn/K∗ c
n/K
=
K
K∗
bn/K∗ c
n/K∗
≥ K
2K∗
.
We used bx c/x ≥ 12 when x ≥ 1. Because µK > 12 and 1−µK ≥ A/Kα, we have µK(1−µK) ≥ A/2Kα.
Also recall that µ∗ ≥ 12 + , which means that µ∗(1− µ∗) ≤ (12 + )(12 − ), and K ≤ n. Therefore,
C
(
(4µ∗(1− µ∗))L∗/LK
4µK(1− µK)
)LK/2
≤ C
(
Kα(1− 42)K/2K∗
2A
)LK/2
We show that the RHS is at most 1, or equivalently its logarithm is at most zero, concluding the proof.
Taking the logarithm of the RHS, we get:
LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
lnK − 1
2
ln 2A
)
+ lnC
(LK≥1,C>1)≤ LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
lnK − 1
2
ln 2A+ lnC
)
≤ LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
(
ln
−4αK∗/e
ln(1− 42) −
ln(1− 42)
4αK∗
K
)
− 1
2
ln 2A+ ln
8
3
)
.
The last step follows by using the fact for any z > 0, lnx ≤ ln(z/e) + x/z, which holds because for any
y = x/z > 0, ln y − y + 1 is maximized at y = 1. In the last step, we set z = −4αK∗/ ln(1 − 42).
Collecting terms, we have
LK
(
K
8K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
ln
−4αK∗/e
ln(1− 42) −
1
2
ln 2A+ ln
8
3
)
=
LK ln(1− 42)
8
(
K
K∗
− c
)
≤ 0
where the last step follows because K/K∗ > c and ln(1− 42) < 0.
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As a corollary, we will show that Theorem 2 can be applied to any F with continuous density function,
which means that in such cases the optimal number of groups with homogeneous size is Ω(n). To this end,
we prove a lemma stating that any NOISY-MAX group competence function (Example 3) is polynomially
bounded away from 1.
Lemma 6. For any NOISY-MAX group competence function µ~p and any F with a continuous density f on
[0, 1], we have µ~p(K) ≤ 1− ( 12 max(f))/K. Moreover, the max representative democracy µmax is concave,
which means that µmax(K) + µmax(K + 2) ≤ 2µmax(K + 1) for all K ≥ 1.
Proof. It suffices to prove the inequality for µmax because expectation of any other order statistics is no
more than it. Since f is continuous on the compact set [0, 1], it attains a maximum B = max(f). We note
that since f is a density on [0, 1], B ≥ 1. Let F be the CDF for f . We have
µmax(K) = K
∫ 1
0
s f(S)F (s)K−1ds =
∫ 1
0
s(F (s)K)′ds = sF (s)K
∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
F (s)Kds
Since f(s) ≤ B is continuous, F (s) is differentiable and F ′(s) ≤ B. Therefore, using Taylor’s theorem at
s = 1, F (s) = 1 − (1 − s)F ′(t) for some t ∈ [s, 1], and since F ′(t) ≤ B, we have F (s) ≥ max(0, 1 −
B(1− s)). Therefore,
µmax(K) ≤ 1−
∫ 1
0
ds max(0, 1−B(1− s))K = 1−
∫ 1
1−1/B
ds (1−B(1− s))K
= 1− 1
B(K + 1)
(K+1≤2K)
≤ 1− ( 12B )/K.
Concavity of µmax holds because for any K ≥ 1, we have
µmax(K) + µmax(K + 2)− 2µmax(K + 1) =−
∫ 1
0
[
F (s)K + F (s)K+2 − 2F (s)K+1] ds
=−
∫ 1
0
F (s)K(1− F (s))2ds ≤ 0
Combining Theorem 2 and Lemma 6, and notice that µmax provides an upper bound on the competence
of the representative chosen by any representative selection process µ, we have the following surprising
corollary.
Corrollary 1 (Constant group size). Suppose F has a continuous density function on [0, 1]. For any µ such
that µ(K∗) > 0.5 for some K∗. The optimal number of representatives for homogeneous groups is at least
n
cK∗ , where c is the constant defined in Theorem 2.
Therefore, the representative democracy with fixed group size makes better choices than the representa-
tive democracy with fixed number of representatives. More discussions can be found in the next subsection.
One limitation of Theorem 2 is that it only holds for homogeneous group size. Next, we will extend the
theorem to inhomogeneous groups, allowing groups to have different sizes, at the cost of further requiring
that the group competence function µ(K) to be concave. Let L∗(n) denote the optimal number of groups
for n voters.
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Theorem 3 (Optimal number of representatives for general group sizes). Suppose Cost(L) is a constant,
there exists K∗ ∈ N such that µ(K∗) ≥ 12 +  for 0 <  < 12 , µ is concave, and µ(K) ≤ 1 − A/Kα for
constant A < 1 and α ≥ 0. Then, for any n, L∗(n) ≥
⌊
n
K∗
⌋
/c, where
c =
−4
ln(1− 42)
(
ln
32
92A
+ α ln
4αK∗
e
− α ln | ln(1− 42)|
)
.
Proof. We show how to modify the proof for Theorem 2. LetR( ~K∗, µ) denote the probability that the major-
ity vote among the L∗ representatives is correct under partition ~K∗. First, we may assume that bn/K∗ c > c,
because otherwise the RHS in the bound is less than 1 and the theorem automatically holds.
Our key technique is to allow group size to be non-integers by extending µ to a piece-wise linear function
µ¯ : R≥0 → [0, 1]. Then, we show that for any given number of groups L, R( ~K, µ) is maximized when ~K
partitions n into L equal-size groups, each with nL voters. This is guaranteed by concavity of µ and a result
by Fey (2003).
More precisely, let µ¯ : R≥0 → [0, 1] be the piecewise linear function that interpolates µ at the integers.
It follows that µ¯ is concave and bounded above by 1−A/kα for all k ≥ 1. For any L ∈ N, we let k = n/L
and let R¯(L, p) denote the probability to obtain a majority of successes in L Bernoulli trials, where each trial
succeeds with probability p. The following Lemma gives an upper bound on the probability for majority
voting to succeed, when the average competence is at most 0.5. This answers an open question in (Owen
et al., 1989, Lemma 5) and (Fey, 2003).
Lemma 7 (Poisson-Binomial majority). A Poisson-Binomial random variable X = x1 + · · ·+ xn is a sum
of n independent Bernoulli trials xi with respective (possibly different) success-probabilities pi. Let q be
the average probability, nq =
∑
i pi and suppose q ≤ 12 . Then, the probability to get a strict majority of
successful trials is bounded by a constant. Specifically,
1. If n = 2K is even:
P[X > n/2] ≤ 1−B, where B =
bn/2 c∑
i=0
(n
i
)
qi(1− q)n−i ≤ 1
2
(1)
2. If n = 2K + 1 is odd and n ≥ 1/(1− 2q) then e˚q:maj-even holds. Otherwise,
P[X > n/2] ≤ √1−B, where B =
n∑
i=0
(
2n
i
)
qi(1− q)2n−i ≤ 1
2
The bounds are in terms of a standard Binomial with probability q equal to the average probability in the
ensemble. The bound for even n is tight (set all probabilities to q). The boundary case which we alluded to
earlier is for odd n < 1/(1− 2q). We conjecture that the bound for odd n can be improved (for q = 12 , we
believe P[majority] ≤ 1/√e, which is better than 1/√2). It is interesting that the probability of a majority
can depend so much on whether the number of voters is even or odd, and this is true even asymptotically
(for q = 12 , set K of the pi to 0 and K + 1 of the pi to
2K+1
2K+2 , then P[majority] = (
2K+1
2K+2)
K+1 → 1/√e).
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Continuing with the proof of Theorem 3, consider a partition ~K(n) with | ~K(n)| = L and define the
average competence q of the representatives by Lq =
∑L
i=1 µ([K(n)]i). If q ≤ 12 , then by Lemma 7,
R( ~K, µ) < 1√
2
. Using the bound for R− in Lemma 5, with bn/K∗ c > −4ln(1−42)(α2 lnn + ln 4
√
2
3
√
A
), we
have R( ~K∗, µ) > 1√2 and so
~K(n) cannot be optimal. Therefore, we may assume that q > 12 .
By concavity of µ¯, for any ~K(n) with | ~K(n)| = L, we have µ¯(k) = µ¯(n/L) ≥∑Li=1 1Lµ([K(n)]i) =
q > 12 . By (Fey, 2003), since q >
1
2 , the probability of a majority is maximized when all the probabilities
are the same as the average value q. And by monotonicity, R¯(L, ·) can only increase in going from q to
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µ¯(k). Therefore, R¯(L, µ¯(k)) ≥ R( ~K, µ). What we have established is that if you fix the number of groups,
then we may assume that the probability to get a majority cannot be better than the outcome where all group
sizes are homogeneous (possibly non-integer), equal to n/L. This gives us an upper bound on the quality of
the number of groups L.
The rest of the proof is to show that if L is smaller than the claim of the theorem, then this upper bound
on the quality is less than the choosing L∗ equal to the bound in the Theorem, therefore proving that L is
not optimal. This part of the proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Theorem 2, by replacing K by
k and replacing µ(K) by µ¯(k). Lemma 1–5 still hold because they do not depend on k. We note that the
key steps involving K in the proof of Theorem 2 are µ(K) ≥ 0.5 and 1 − µ(K) ≥ A/Kα, which hold for
k because we focus on L such that µ(n/L) > 0.5 and µ¯(k) ≤ 1−A/kα.
Next, we further extend Theorem 3 by showing that the optimal partitioning function ~K must be nearly
homogeneous. This property comes at the cost of requiring that µ is log-concave and 1 − µ is log-convex.
Log-concavity is a weaker assumption than concavity. Let us consider an example.
Example 4 (Log-concavity and log-convexity of µmax). For uniformly distributed voters F = Uniform[0, 1]
as in Example 1, the MAX group competence function µmax(K) = K/(K + 1) is log-concave (it is also
concave). Log-convexity of 1 − µmax holds because 1 − µmax(K) = 1/(K + 1) and (K + 2)2 > (K +
1)(K + 3), therefore (1− µmax(K))(1− µmax(K + 2)) > (1− µmax(K + 1))2. 
Theorem 4 (Near-Homogeneity of group sizes). Suppose Cost(L) is a constant, the group competence
function µ(K) is log-concave and non-decreasing, and further that 1 − µ(K) is log-convex. Given L
groups, there is an optimal partition (K1, . . . ,KL) of n into the L groups with no two groups differing in
size by more than 1. That is, maxiKi −miniKi ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose we have a partition of n voters into L groups with sizes K1 ≤ K2 ≤ · · · ≤ KL, and
suppose that KL − K1 ≥ 2. Let µ1 = µ(K1) and µL = µ(KL). Let the groups K2, . . . ,KL−1 yield an
arbitrary ensemble A of L− 2 representatives which is fixed in this proof. Define the functions
f(k) = P[k successes in A]
Q(k) = P[at least k successes in A] = f(k) + f(k + 1) + · · ·+ f(L− 2).
Let M = d (L+ 1)/2 e be the majoirty threshold for the L representatives and define P as the probability
that a majority of successes is obtained from all the representatives. Conditioning on the votes of represen-
tatives 1 and L, we have,
P = µ1µLQ(M − 2) + (µ1(1− µL) + µL(1− µ1))Q(M − 1) + (1− µ1)(1− µL)Q(M)
= µ1µL(Q(M − 2) +Q(M)− 2Q(M − 1)) + (µ1 + µL)(Q(M − 1)−Q(M)) +Q(M)
= µ1µL(f(M − 2)− f(M − 1)) + (µ1 + µL)f(M − 1) +Q(M)
= µ1µLf(M − 2) + (µ1 + µL − µ1µL)f(M − 1) +Q(M)
= µ1µLf(M − 2) + (1− (1− µ1)(1− µL))f(M − 1) +Q(M)
We now consider the partition of the n voters obtained by keeping the ensemble A fixed, increasing K1 to
K1 + 1 and decreasing KL to KL − 1. Let P ′ be the probability of a majority for the new representatives.
The only difference with P is that µ1 → µ(K1 + 1) and µL → µ(KL − 1). By log-concavity of µ,
µ(K1+1)µ(KL−1) ≥ µ1µL. By log-convexity of 1−µ, (1−µ(K1+1))(1−µ(KL−1)) ≤ (1−µ1)(1−µL).
Therefore P ′ ≥ P . As long as the difference in largest and smallest sizes is at least 2, we can continue
merging without decreasing P , proving the theorem.
Theorem 4 also applies to non-constant cost functions because the number of groups is fixed.
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3.2.1 Numerical Example of Optimal Group Size
As an application of our results, we consider the uniform voters with MAX representative selection process
(Example 2) applied to US House. Below, we show how the optimal homogeneous group size K∗ and the
minimum group size required to achieve consistency K∗ depend on the upper bound on a voter’s probability
of being correct, b. We fix a, the lower bound, to 0.45, so F = Uniform[0.45, b]. When b is small, as voters
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
upper bound on voter probability, b
0
5
10
15
20
gr
ou
p 
siz
e,
 K
K*
K
*
Figure 2: Optimal group size.
get wiser (b goes up), K∗ and K∗ are decreasing. At some point, even the direct-democracy (K∗ = 1) is
consistent. For very large b, the optimal group size starts to increase due to the µ(1 − µ) term. In general,
the optimal group size is less than about 5, the size of the typical household. The optimal representative
democracy is obtained when each household elects a head to vote on its behalf.
The optimal group size is useful to know, but for practical purposes, there may not be a significant
difference between different values of K for a large n. Let us take the US House as an example, which has
435 representatives. Suppose the voting population is about n = 235 million, and that voter competence is
uniformly distributed from 0.45 to 0.52 (the average competence is slightly less than 0.5).
K = 1 K∗ = 3 K∗ = 9 5× House 2× House House
Success rate 0% 100% 100% 97% 88% 80%
In this simple setting, direct democracy (K = 1) would be wrong, and the current size of House is far from
optimal, 20% less accurate than what is achievable. Doubling congress gets you to 88% and multiplying by
5 pretty much gets you to optimal. A House that is 20 times larger (each member representing 35K citizen)
would be essentially indistinguishable from optimal. This suggests that a much larger House is needed for
noisy issues like the one in this example. Also note that if group sizes are about 5 (the size of a household)
then we have near-perfection results.
3.3 Optimal Group Size for Single Issue: Polynomial Cost of Voting
In this subsection, we focus on the setting where the cost of voting and the benefit of correct decision are
both polynomial.
Theorem 5 (Optimal homogeneous group size, polynomial cost and polynomial benefit). Suppose Cost(L)Ben(n) =
Θ(L
q1
nq2 ) for constants q1 > 0 and q2 > 0, there exists K∗ ∈ N such that µ(K∗) > 12 , µ is non-decreasing,
and for all K ∈ N, µ(K) ≤ 1 − A/Kα for constants A > 0 and α ≥ 0. Then, the optimal group size
K∗hom(n) = Ω(n/ log n).
Moreover, we have:
(i) If limK→∞ µ(K) < 1, then K∗hom(n) = Θ(n/ log n).
(ii) If there exists B, β > 0 such that µ(K) ≥ 1−B/Kβ , then K∗hom(n) = Θ(n).
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Proof. We first prove that the optimal number of groups L∗Hom is O(log n). Let K
′ be the smallest number
such that µ(K ′) > 0.5. For any K > K ′ and L = bn/Kc, it follows from Lemma 5 that
Rn( ~HK , µ)− Cost(L)Ben(n) = 1−Q(L, n),
where Q(L, n) = Θ( (4µ(K)(1−µ(K)))
L/2√
L
+ L
q1
nq2 ). This is because µ(K) > µ(K
′) > 0.5.
Therefore, L∗Hom = arg minLQ(L, n). For any L ≥ n/K ′, we let p(L) = 4µ(dn/Le)(1− µ(dn/Le)),
which means that p(L) is non-decreasing in L. Let c1, c2 > 0 be such that for all L ≥ n/K ′,
c1(
p(L)L/2√
L
+
Lq1
nq2
) ≤ Q(L, n) ≤ c2(p(L)
L/2
√
L
+
Lq1
nq2
)
Let p′ = 4µ(K ′)(1 − µ(K ′)). We have p′ < 1. Let c = −2q2/ log p′, which means that (p′) c2 logn = 1nq2 .
When n ≥ 21/c, we have
Q(c log n, n) ≤ c2((p
′)
c
2
logn
√
c log n
+
(c log n)q1
nq2
) ≤ c2( 1
nq2
√
c log n
+
(c log n)q1
nq2
) ≤ 2c2 (c log n)
q1
nq2
For any L ≥ c q1
√
2c2
c1
log n, we have Q(L, n) > c1Lq1/nq2 = 2c2
(c logn)q1
nq2 ≥ Q(c log n, n). It follows that
arg minLQ(L, n) ≤ c2cc1 log n = O(log n).
To prove (i), let b = limK→∞ µ(K) < 1. For any L < − q2log(4b(1−b)) log n, we have
Q(L, n) > c1
p(L)L/2√
L
> c1
(4b(1− b))L/2√
L
> c1
(4b(1− b))−
q2
2 log(4b(1−b)) logn
√
L
= Θ(
1
nq2/2
√
log n
)
It follows that when n is large enough, for any L < − q2log(4b(1−b)) log n, we have Q(L, n) > 2c2 (c logn)
q1
nq2 =
Q(c log n, n). This means that K∗hom(n) = Ω(n/ log n).
To prove (ii), let L¯ = 2q2/β, it is not hard to check that Q(L¯, n) = O(( 4B(n/L¯)β )
L¯/2/
√
L¯ + L¯q1/nq2) =
O(1/nq2). Therefore, for any L larger than some constant, we have Q(L, n) > Lq1/nq2 > Q(L¯, n), which
means that K∗hom(n) = Θ(n).
4 Optimal Representative Democracy for Multiple Issues
We now extend our setting to d ≥ 2 issues, I1, . . . , Id with fixed cost of voting. Each voter’s type is
now represented by a 2d-dimensional competence vector ~c, which is a distribution over {0, 1}d. A voter’s
competence vector represents her probability to cast a combination of votes over the d issues. Let ∆2d
denote the 2d-dimensional simplex, which is the set of all possible competence vectors. We assume that
each voter’s competence vector is generated i.i.d. from a distribution F over ∆2d .
Example 5. For two issues I1 and I2, let F be the uniform distribution over two competence vectors ~c1,~c2,
as illustrated below, where (0, 1) means that the voter is wrong on issue 1 but correct on issue 2.
F (0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) (1, 1)
1
2@~c1 2/9 4/9 1/9 2/9
1
2@~c2 1/9 1/9 4/9 3/9
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The two issues are independent in ~c1: issue I1 (respectively, I2) takes 1 with probability 13 (respectively,
2
3 ), independent of the other issue. The two issues are correlated in ~c2. 
Suppose K voters v`,1, . . . , v`,K choose a representative r` with competence vector ~c`. As with one
issue, the representative can be summarized by E(~c`) ∈ ∆2d . Thus, we can succinctly describe a d-issue
representative selection process as a group competence function.
Definition 7. A representative selection process over d issues is a group competence function ρ : N 7→
∆2d .
4 The multi-issue competence function ρ induces d single-issue marginal group competence functions
µ1, µ2, . . . , µd, where µi is the marginal distribution for issue Ii. For any K ∈ N, let ρ(K) = (pα1,α2,...,αd :
∀i, αi ∈ {0, 1}). Then, µi(K) =
∑
α:αi=1
pα1,α2,...,αd .
Example 6. Continuing Example 5, suppose for a group of two voters independently sampled from F , the
representative selection process is to choose the voter with maximum expected number of correct votes.
Then, the representative will be a ~c2 voter with probability 34 and a ~c1 voter with probability
1
4 . This group
competence function, called MAX-SUM and denoted by ρms, will output
ρms(2) =
1
4
~c1 +
3
4
~c2 =
(
5
36
,
7
36
,
13
36
,
11
36
)
And the marginal group competence functions are µ1(2) = 1336 +
11
36 =
2
3 , µ2(2) =
7
36 +
11
36 =
1
2 . 
As with a single issue, when there are d issues, given a partition function ~K and a group competence
function ρ, we let Sd
n, ~K,ρ
denote the 2d-dimensional random variable that is the average of L(n) = | ~K(n)|
independent random variables (ρ([ ~K(n)]1), . . . , ρ([ ~K(n)]L(n))), where each ρ([ ~K(n)]i) represent the ran-
dom vote on d issues by the representative of group i. We let Rdn( ~K, ρ) = P[Sdn, ~K,ρ >
1
2 · ~1] denote the
probability that majority voting is correct on all d issues.
4.1 Consistent Representative Democracy for Multiple Issues
Our next theorem extends the Condorcet Jury Theorem to representative democracy with multiple issues. It
states that when the marginal group competence functions µi’s are monotonic, the representative democracy
is consistent if and only for each issue, there exists a group size for which marginal group competence of
that issue is strictly larger than 0.5.
Theorem 6. For d ≥ 2, let ρ be a d-issue group competence function with monotonic marginals µi.5 Then,
ρ is consistent w.r.t. every issue if and only if every marginal is consistent, i.e. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, there
exists Ki such that µi(Ki) > 12 .
The proof uses the union bound and is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The full proof can be found in
the appendix.
4.2 Optimal Group Size for Multiple Issues
We now prove the analog of Theorem 2 for multiple issues. Namely an upper bound on the optimal homo-
geneous group size for any consistent multi-issue representative democracy. We recall that K∗hom(n) is the
optimal partition function for n voters.
4We use ρ to distinguish from single-issue group competence function µ.
5Technically, all we need is that µi(K) can be lower-bounded by an increasing function ofK, and that this lower bound exceeds
0.5 for some Ki.
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Theorem 7. Let ρ be a d-issue group competence function for which there exists K∗ ∈ N such that for all
i ≤ d, µi(K∗) ≥ 12 +  for constant 0 <  < 12 , and µi(K) ≤ 1 − A/Kα for constant A < 1 and α ≥ 0.
Then, K∗hom(n) ≤ (c− 8ln(1−42) ln d)K∗, where
c =
−4
ln(1− 42)
(
ln
32
92A
+ α ln
4αK∗
e
− α ln | ln(1− 42)|
)
.
Proof. Given any distribution γ over {0, 1}d and any L ≥ 1, we let Q−(L, γ) (respectively, Q+(L, γ))
denote the probability that for every one of the d issues, the majority of voters vote for 1, where there are L
independent voters, the first L− 1 vote according to γ, and the last voter always vote for 0 (respectively 1)
for all issues. We first extend Lemma 5 to multiple issues.
Lemma 8. For any multi-issue representative democracy with group competence function ρ and given n,K,
let the marginals be µi and let q = mini µi(K) be the minimum marginal. Then,
1− d
(
2
(2q − 1)
)
· (4q(1− q))
L/2
√
piL
≤ Q−(L, ρ(K)) ≤ Q+(L, ρ(K)) ≤ 1− 3
8q
· (4q(1− q))
L/2
√
piL
We can now mimic the analysis in the proof of Theorem 2 to prove an upper bound on the optimal group
size in a multi-issue representative democracy. We give only the main steps, omitting some details. Let
L∗ = bn/K∗ c, q∗ = mini µi(K∗), LK = bn/K c, and qK = mini µi(K). Using Lemma 8, q∗ ≥ 12 + 
and qk ≤ 1−A/Kα (which implies q(1− q) ≥ A/2Kα), we get
Rdn(
~HK∗ , ρ)−Rdn( ~HK , ρ) ≥Q−(L∗, ρ(K∗))−Q+(LK , ρ(K)) ≥ (pos)
1− dC (Kα(1− 42)K/2K∗
2A
)LK/2
Here C = 8µK/3 ≤ 8/3. It now remains to prove that the expression in square parentheses is positive,
for which it suffices to show that the logarithm of the second term is at most 0. Taking the logarithm of the
second term,
LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
lnK − 1
2
ln 2A
)
+ ln(dC)
(LK≥1,dC>1)≤ LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
lnK − 1
2
ln 2A+ ln(dC)
)
≤ LK
(
K
4K∗
ln(1− 42) + α
2
(
ln
−4αK∗/e
ln(1− 42) −
ln(1− 42)
4αK∗
K
)
− 1
2
ln 2A+ ln
8
3
+ ln d
)
=
LK ln(1− 42)
8
(
K
K∗
− c+ 8 ln d
ln(1− 42)
)
≤ 0
The last step follows from the choice of c.
4.3 Realizing a Consistent Representative Democracy
In Theorem 7, the group competency function ρ is given as part of the input. In this section we focus on
representative selection processes that would lead to a consistent representative democracy. We first start
with an example on F where no representative democracy is consistent.
Example 7. Let F be the uniform distribution over two competence vectors: ~c1 from Example 5 and ~c2 =
(29 ,
1
9 ,
4
9 ,
2
9) for (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), respectively. The two issues are independent in both ~c1 (
1
3 for I1
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and 23 for I2) and ~c2 (
2
3 for I1 and
1
3 for I2). We note that for each type of voter, the marginal competences
of two issues always sum up to 1.
Let ρ denote the group competence function of any representative selection process that chooses a group
member as the representative. Then, the marginal competences of the chosen representative must sum up
to 1. Therefore, for any K, we must have µ1(K) + µ2(K) = 1. Therefore, for any partition function
~K and any n, either the average marginal competence for I1 is no more than 0.5, or the average marginal
competence for I2 is no more than 0.5, which means that the majority vote of I1 or I2 will not be correct
with probability 1 as n→∞ (Lemma 7). 
We see in Example 7 that when the issues are correlated, sometimes nothing can be done to get multi-
issue consistency. A natural selection process is for a group to choose the voter having the maximum “total
competence” over all the issues. This is the process used in Example 5.
Definition 8 (Max-Sum Process). Given a group of K voters whose votes on d issues are represented
by random variables v1, . . . , vK , the MAX-SUM representative selection process chooses a voter i with
maximum E[vi] ·~1. Let ρms denote its group competence function.
ρms naturally extends the MAX group competence function µmax defined in Example 2. We will prove
that ρms works well when the d issues are independent, formally defined below.
Definition 9 (Independent Issues). In this setting, each voter’s competence vector is uniquely characterized
by a vector of d numbers (p1, . . . , pd), where pi is the probability that the voter’s vote for issue i is correct,
independent of the other issues. We further assume that F is a product distribution f1(p1)f2(p2) · · · fd(pd),
and each fj(·) has support on (12 , 1].6
Theorem 8. The max sum representative democracy is consistent for independent issues.
Proof. Based on the distributions fi(·), letMi be the maximum possible value attainable by pi (Mi ≥ 12 +)
and let M =
∑
iMi be the maximum possible value for a voter’s sum of probabilities
∑d
i=1 pi. The basic
idea in the proof is to show that for sufficiently large K, the representative’s
∑
i pi approaches M , which
means that each probability must approach Mi (all above 12 + ), and once that happens, the majority vote
among many representatives will get all issues correct.
For a voter, let s =
∑
i pi. First, let us prove that the probability for s to be close to its maximum
possible value M is large. Recall that Mi ≥ 12 + . Let Pi = P[pi ≥Mi− 12d] > 0 (because fi has support
on (12 , 1]). Let P = P1×· · ·×Pd. Then, {p1 ≥M1− 12d and p2 ≥M2− 12d and . . . and pd ≥Md− 12d}
implies {s ≥M − 12} and we have P[s ≥M − 12] ≥ P1 × · · · × Pd = P > 0.
Let us now consider K independent voters and the sums of probabilities s1, . . . , sK . The representative
r is picked as the voter with maximum sum, and we have
P[max
`
s` ≥M − 12] = 1−
∏
`
P[s` < M − 12] = 1− P[s < M − 12]K ≥ 1− (1− P )K .
Observe that s ≥M − 12 implies pi ≥Mi − 12 for every issue Ii. Therefore, for the representative r,
P[pi ≥Mi − 12] ≥ P[s(r) ≥M − 12] ≥ 1− (1− P )K .
Since Mi ≥ 12 + , pi ≥Mi − 12 implies pi ≥ 12 + 12, and so P[pi ≥ 12 + 12] ≥ 1− (1− P )K .
The marginal single-issue competence function for issue Ii is just E[pi],
µi(K) = E[pi] ≥ P[pi ≥ 12 + 12]× (12 + 12) ≥ (1− (1− P )K)× (12 + 12)
We thus have a lower bound for each marginal density which is monotonically increasing in K. Further,
by setting K > log( 1+)/ log(1− P ), we find that µi(K) > 12 . Therefore the marginal single-issue group
competence functions are monotonic and consistent. By Theorem 8, the multiple-issue group competence
function is consistent.
6Mi = supp{p : fi(p) > 0} ≥ 12 +  and fi has nonzero support at Mi, that is P[pj ≥Mi − δ] > 0 for all δ > 0.
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5 Summary and Future Work
We set the mathematical foundation for studying the quality-quantity tradeoff in a representative democracy
by introducing a mathematical framework for studying representative democracy, and show that under gen-
eral and natural conditions, the optimal group size is constant when the cost of voting is a constant, and is
Ω(n/ log n) when the cost and benefit are both polynomial.
There are many open questions and future directions under our framework. Can we extend our results
to inhomogeneous representative selection processes, e.g. different states use different processes to choose
representatives? Does diversity in population help make better decisions? More generally, it would be inter-
esting and important to consider similar extensions as done for the Condorcet Jury Theorem, for example to
inhomogeneous agents and strategic agents.
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